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The increase in the number of mobile devices that use the Android operating system has attracted the attention of 
cybercriminals who want to disrupt or gain unauthorized access to them through malware infections. To prevent such 
malware, cybersecurity experts and researchers require datasets of malware samples that most available antivirus 
software programs cannot detect. However, researchers have infrequently discussed how to identify evolving Android 
malware characteristics from different sources. In this paper, we analyze a wide variety of Android malware datasets 
to determine more discriminative features such as permissions and intents. We then apply machine-learning 
techniques on collected samples of different datasets based on the acquired features’ similarity. We perform random 
sampling on each cluster of collected datasets to check the antivirus software’s capability to detect the sample. We 
also discuss some common pitfalls in selecting datasets. Our findings benefit firms by acting as an exhaustive source 
of information about leading Android malware datasets. 
Keywords: Malware Detection, Data Analytics, Android Package Kits (APKs), Clustering, Machine Learning, Malware 
Dataset Selection. 
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“It’s difficult to imagine the power that you’re going to have when so many different sorts of data are available.” 
—Tim Berners-Lee, Inventor of the World Wide Web (Michael, n.d.) 
1 Introduction 
In 2018, the global population of smartphone users reached about 2.53 billion (Statista, 2019c). These 
smartphones predominantly used the Android mobile operating system (OS), which had an 88 percent 
market share in that year (Statista, 2019a). Android’s open-source software allows millions of developers 
to deploy applications (commonly known as apps) on the Google Play Store or third-party platforms (e.g., 
SlideMe, F-Droid, torrents, etc.) that users can download to customize their smartphones accordingly. As 
of 2018, the Google Play Store contains around 2.6 million apps (Statista, 2019b) that facilitate diverse 
tasks such as writing documents, shopping online, renting homes, or requesting food delivery.  
Due to its open-source software stack, Android has gained popularity compared to other operating 
systems; unfortunately, this feature means cybercriminals often target it as well. Attackers create malign 
Android apps or malware—spoofed versions of genuine apps that they deploy on Google Play Store or 
third-party sources——to attract users. After users successfully install malware on their device, it can 
perform malicious functions such as stealing, deleting, modifying, or hiding data. 
Consequently, much research has focused on analyzing and detecting Android malware with many tools 
and services, such as malware datasets. Thus, in order to facilitate research on malware detection, 
researchers have developed a secondary market of extensive lists of known malware (i.e., malware 
datasets). These malware datasets include Contagio, Drebin, AndRadar, Ransomware, VirusShare, 
AndroZoo, HelDroid, and Genome. These datasets focus on profiling malware as comprehensively as 
possible. In this study, we evaluate some critical aspects of the leading malware datasets and provide 
guidelines to help firms and researchers select the malware datasets whose malware antivirus software 
has the most trouble detecting. To the best of our knowledge, this work constitutes the first to critically 
examine an available array of Android malware datasets. 
2 Motivation 
In recent years, individuals have begun to use smartphones not only for communication but also for 
writing documentation, generating PDFs, sending emails, and so on. Further, today’s smartphones from 
companies such as OnePlus, Samsung, HTC, and Asus have enough random access memory (RAM) that 
they allow users to run multiple apps simultaneously without compromising speed. Users can access 
various apps (such as mobile banking, social networking, online shopping, games, etc.) on smartphones 
that perform similar tasks to software programs on desktop computers. Cybercriminals, however, can 
make money more easily from smartphones than personal computers (PC). For example, malware can 
send an SMS from a user’s phone to a premium-rate number where a network operator will debit the 
charging cost from the user even though the malware triggered the action (La Polla, Martinelli, & 
Sgandurra, 2013). 
While much literature has discussed malware detection for Microsoft Windows (on PC), the research on 
malware for Android devices remains an emerging field due in part to the relative lack of datasets. 
Moreover, one cannot apply PC security solutions to Android smartphones due to the latter’s limited 
resources (such as CPU and battery) and apps’ different features (such as permissions, intents, global 
positioning system (GPS), etc.). In the existing literature, researchers have extracted features from 
Android malware and performed experiments in which they have trained machine-learning models to 
detect malware. However, attackers continually develop malware with new strategies, such as making it 
undetectable for long periods of time (known as zero-day malware). The new types of Android malware 
continuously emerge in different forms, including spyware, grayware, ransomware, adware, and so on. 
Unique Android malware variants with different signatures and features continue to grow in number. For 
example, in a study in the ELE Times (ELE Times, 2018), unique malware samples grew by 43 percent, 
whereas the number of malicious families grew by 32 percent. Moreover, anti-malware software cannot 
detect newer types of malware including viruses, trojans, grayware, and ransomware (Sen, 2018). Thus, 
to perform experimental work using machine learning models, practitioners and researchers need updated 
and comprehensive Android malware datasets for feature extraction. Furthermore, given that practitioners 
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require high-quality data (which contains metadata, the purpose behind its creation, sample types, and 
measurement errors), we need to compare existing datasets in detail (Link et al., 2017). 
As such, we conducted a comprehensive study on Android malware datasets to identify their key aspects. 
We extracted features (i.e., permissions and intents) of all the datasets we collected and grouped them 
into clusters according to similarities in their acquired features. We also used antivirus software to analyze 
random samples from each database cluster to check whether it detected malicious code. Practitioners 
and researchers can use our findings to select the most appropriate dataset which consists of malicious 
samples that remain undetected by antivirus software. 
3 Contribution 
One cannot consider experiments on detecting Android malware that do not use an appropriate Android 
malware dataset complete. For example, practitioners and researchers working on detecting Android 
ransomware (a type of malware that demands ransom from victims via cryptocurrency to decrypt/unlock 
their files on mobile phones (Sipior, Bierstaker, Borchardt, & Ward, 2018)) specifically need an Android 
ransomware dataset for research. Since creating a primary dataset (i.e., collecting malware oneself) can 
involve considerable costs in human labor and other resources, researchers and practitioners often use 
secondary datasets (data that others (often in cooperation) have collected) that include malware samples. 
In particular, for such experiments, researchers and practitioners require raw data in the form of Android 
package kits (APKs) that they can reverse engineer and convert into a readable format (Java/XML). They 
then extract the features (such as permissions, intents, system calls, etc.) from the malicious and benign 
samples’ XML and Java code. Finally, they employ various machine-learning models (e.g., logistic 
regression, support vector machine, neural network, etc.) that use these features as input to classify and 
detect Android malware. 
Many studies have used primary datasets (Andronio, Zanero, & Maggi, 2015; Arp et al., 2014; Chen et al., 
2018) and secondary datasets (Ab Razak et al., 2018; Saracino, Sgandurra, Dini, & Martinelli, 2016; Xiao, 
Zhang, Mercaldo, Hu, & Sangaiah, 2017; Yuan, Lu, & Xue, 2016) to detect Android malware. However, no 
study has examined existing Android malware datasets to identify their characteristics, what malware 
types they cover, what difficulties researchers face while selecting them, and whether antivirus software 
can detect the malware that they contain. 
In particular, we clustered all the datasets we collected after reverse engineering them and extracting their 
features to identify malware with similar kinds of features. We then used VirusTotal (a Web interface to 
scan malware with over 70 antivirus software programs) to analyze random samples from each cluster 
and determine which ones the available antivirus software detected the least. We conducted this study to 
familiarize practitioners and researchers with these datasets and enable them to appropriately choose a 
dataset—one of the most useful resources for their work. For example, researchers and practitioners who 
develop detection methods for Android malware need datasets that comprise malicious samples that most 
antivirus software cannot detect. This study also helps researchers and practitioners by providing 
information on datasets that include benign samples. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 4, we review the literature on aggregating and using datasets. 
In Section 5, we introduce the leading Android malware datasets: Contagio, Drebin, AndRadar, 
Ransomware, VirusShare, and AndroZoo. In Section 6, we present implementation and experimental 
details. Specifically, we extract features from all malicious samples in each dataset such as permissions 
(allowing apps to access data stored on the smartphone) and intents (abstract objects that an app uses to 
request an action from another app) after performing reverse engineering. We also discuss how we 
performed clustering based on similarity in the extracted features from each dataset and then analyzed 
malware samples in VirusTotal. In Section 7, we investigate each dataset to identify the common pitfalls in 
data selection. In Section 8, we outline the evaluation metrics we used to determine how effectively 
antivirus software could detect malware in the large datasets. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude the paper. 
4 Literature Review 
Since the literature lacks research studies on Android malware datasets, we reviewed research papers in 
which authors collected datasets (from other fields) and used them to detect Android malware. As Figure 
1 shows, we divided the literature survey into two parts: 1) dataset aggregation and 2) dataset utilization. 
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Figure 1. Literature Survey 
4.1 Dataset Aggregation 
Dataset aggregation refers to collecting and merging datasets from numerous sources such as the 
Internet, speech, image, sports, and medical records. We found several studies in which researchers 
performed experimental work on secondary datasets to identify malicious activities. 
Smith et al. (2011) discussed the reasons behind choosing secondary datasets. They explored steps to 
first clarify the research topic to choose an appropriate dataset and then understood it properly to perform 
meaningful analysis on it. Paranthaman and Thuraisingham (2017) collected malware for Windows PC 
and Android OS. They focused on choosing the best tool to analyze malware rather than studying 
datasets. However, they did not cover all Android malware sources as they focused more on malware on 
Windows PC. 
Galal, Mahdy, and Atiea (2016) collected the Windows PC malware dataset from VirusSign (2019) and 
performed dynamic analysis on it by executing the samples in a virtual environment. They analyzed 
malicious samples’ application program interface (API) calls and employed machine-learning techniques 
(such as decision trees, random forest, and support vector machine) to detect malware. Sharma, Krishna, 
and Sahay (2019) collected the Windows PC malware dataset from Kaggle’s Microsoft Malware 
Classification Challenge. They performed static analysis by examining how frequently opcode occurred 
and applied a feature-selection method (fisher score) to obtain top-most features. They employed 
machine-learning techniques (such as Logistic Model, J48, REPTree, and Naïve Bayes) in WEKA tool to 
detect the malware. 
Bailey et al. (2007) collected Internet malware samples from the network security community and Arbor 
Malware Library. They examined these samples using antivirus software including McAfee, F-Prot, 
ClamAV, Trend, and Symantec to identify unique labels. They found that each antivirus labeled the same 
malware differently. They observed that antivirus software could not recognize the total number of unique 
labels that exist for malware. Guo, Cheng, and Kelley (2016) gathered a social networking dataset by 
crawling MySpace to detect malware propagation. They built a network in organizations by extracting 
information and social links from user-profiles and user-friend pages, respectively. They analyzed virus 
and worm features by simulating their propagation process using a susceptible infected recovered (SIR) 
model and calculated the risk with hierarchical regression. Xiao, Lin, Sun, and Ma (2019) collected the 
malware dataset from VX Heaven and performed dynamic analysis by executing the samples in Cuckoo 
Sandbox. They also worked on protecting Internet of things (IoT) devices from malware by employing 
deep-learning techniques such as neural network-stacked auto-encoders. 
4.2 Dataset Utilization 
Dataset utilization refers to employing a particular type of dataset such as an Android malware dataset. 
Chen et al. (2018) generated their own Android ransomware dataset and performed static and dynamic 
analyses to detect malware. They analyzed widgets (e.g., labels and list views) and activities (e.g., 
623 Investigating Selection Strategies for Android Malware Datasets Using a Machine-learning Approach 
 
Volume 46 10.17705/1CAIS.04626 Paper 26 
 
capturing photos and dialing a phone). They recorded the coordinates of users’ clicks on the layout 
screen. During the observation, if users initiated no click operation to encrypt files, they considered the 
encryption operation an abnormal activity that Android ransomware performed. Andronio et al. (2015) 
prepared their own dataset (i.e., HelDroid) and used natural language processing to dissect and detect 
mobile ransomware. They classified sentences as scary, payment, porn, law, and copyright to detect 
Android ransomware. They searched for lockNow(), onKeyDown(), and onKeyUp() methods to detect 
screen-locking due to Android ransomware and performed static taint analysis on smali code to detect 
encryption. 
Similarly, Arp et al. (2014) created their own dataset (i.e., Drebin) and performed static analysis on dalvik 
executable (dex) and manifest files. They collected features such as hardware components, requested 
permissions, intents from manifest files, and application program interface (API) calls, and network 
addresses from dex files. Then, they applied the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm to collected 
features to separate two features classes (malicious and benign) with maximum margins. Xiao et al. 
(2017) collected malicious samples from the Drebin dataset and analyzed system call sequences. They 
considered one system call equivalent to one word and one system call sequence to one sentence. They 
employed a deep-learning technique (long short-term memory) to detect Android malware. Onwuzurike et 
al. (2019) used the Drebin dataset and performed static analysis on Java bytecode to collect features 
such as API calls using Androguard and call graphs using Soot and FlowDroid. They built a Markov chain 
to create a feature vector by transitioning the abstracted calls from one possible state to another. Then, 
they applied random forests, the SVM algorithm, and k-nearest neighbor machine-learning algorithms to 
feature vectors to classify apps as malicious or benign. 
Moreover, Yuan et al. (2016) used the Contagio and Genome datasets to detect Android malware. They 
performed static analysis on extensible markup language (XML) and dex files to extract features including 
permissions and APIs. Then, they ran the apps in a sandbox to dynamically analyze their network 
communication, SMS, encryption, and phone calls. They employed deep neural networks on extracted 
features to detect Android malware. Saracino et al. (2016) developed a framework called MADAM by 
using Genome, Contagio, and VirusShare datasets to detect different types of Android malware. They 
analyzed system calls, admin privileges, processes, user activity, apps running in the foreground, SMS, 
contact list, permissions, ratings, and marketplace to detect rootkits, ransomware, spyware, botnet, 
installer malware, and SMS trojans. They trained collected features with the k-NN classifier (k = 1) to 
classify the app as genuine and malicious. Cai, Meng, Ryder, and Yao (2019) collected malicious samples 
from the VirusShare, Drebin, and Genome datasets. They performed dynamic analysis in an Android 
emulator to extract features such as method calls and inter-component communication calls. They 
employed a machine-learning technique (random forest) to detect malware. 
Allix, Bissyande, Klein, and Le Traon (2016) created the AndroZoo repository by collecting millions of 
malicious and benign Android apps for research purpose. Ab Razak et al. (2018) collected benign apps 
from the AndroZoo repository and malicious apps from the Drebin dataset. They analyzed permissions as 
a feature to differentiate malicious and genuine apps. They used particle swarm optimization and the 
information gain algorithm to select the top-most features. After they selected features, they employed 
various machine-learning techniques (random forest, multilayer perceptron, k-NN, adaptive boosting, and 
J48 decision trees) to detect Android malware. They found that multilayer perceptron displayed the most 
accurate results. Pektaş and Acarman (forthcoming) collected benign apps from the AndroZoo repository 
and performed pseudo-dynamic analyses to extract call graphs from operation codes (opcodes) by 
modifying the Androguard tool. They employed a deep neural network that they developed by convolving 
opcode sequences to classify apps as malicious or benign. 
To the best of our knowledge, researchers have not fully studied and analyzed Android malware datasets 
to identify their characteristics, what malware types they cover, what difficulties researchers face while 
selecting them, and whether antivirus software can detect malware that they contain. Accordingly, we 
address the following research question (RQ): 
RQ: Which Android malware dataset contains malicious samples that antivirus software 
detects the least often? 
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5 Dataset Collection 
In this section, we provide information about different Android malware datasets for practitioners and 
researchers to locate these datasets more conveniently. In particular, in Table 1, we provide information 
about the following datasets: Contagio, Drebin, AndRadar, Ransomware, VirusShare, and AndroZoo. 
Some datasets require login credentials for download and/or a password to decompress downloaded files, 
while some datasets require an API key. For example, one needs an API key from AndroZoo repository’s 
authors to download a bunch of android package kits (APKs) together from Github. Further, the datasets 
differ in size: some have many more APKs than others. Some contain all types of malware, while others 
contain specific types of malware. Some contain malicious samples, while others contain both malicious 
and benign samples. The datasets also differ in age. Based on these classifications, we discuss the 
Android malware datasets in the following subsections. 
Table 1. Accumulated Datasets 














Contagio 9 GB 
215 
APKs 
June, 2011, to 
March, 2018 
Website 1 X ✓ X 
Drebin 
(2016) 






Website 2 ✓ ✓ X 
Lindorfer et 
al. (2014b) 






Email X X X 
Chen et al. 
(2018) 
Ransomware 2.5 GB 
2,300 
APKs 









2011 ~ Website 3 ✓ ✓ X 
Allix et al. 





2014 ~ Website 4 X X ✓ 
Key: * : varies, ~: ongoing 
Website 1 = “http://contagiominidump.blogspot.com/” 
Website 2 = “https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/$\sim$danarp/drebin/” 
Website 3 = “https://virusshare.com/” 
Website 4 = “https://androzoo.uni.lu/”, “https://github.com/ArtemKushnerov” 
5.1 Contagio 
Contagio, a mini-dump repository, provides the latest malicious samples, threats, observations, and 
analysis for practitioners and researchers. This dataset contains 215 malicious android package kits 
(APKs) (approx. 3 GB). Mila Parkour (2018)—a security researcher—collected the samples from June, 
2011, to March, 2018. The dataset also contains MAC OSX and Windows OS malware (approx. 3 GB), 
malicious traffic in packet capture (PCAP) format (approx. 2 GB) and executable (EXE) format (approx. 
350 MB). One can access the dataset and download samples from 
http://contagiominidump.blogspot.com/. However, one needs a password to decompress files, which one 
can directly request from the author (the website displays her contact information). 
5.2 Drebin 
Drebin dataset promotes research on detecting Android malware and provides malicious samples with 
extracted features sets to practitioners and researchers. This dataset contains 5,500 malicious APKs from 
180 distinct malware families (approx. 6 GB). Arp et al. (2014) collected the samples from August, 2010, 
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to October, 2012. The dataset also contains feature vectors (API calls, permissions, URLs, intents) found 
in malware samples. One can access the dataset and download samples from https://www.sec.cs.tu-
bs.de/~danarp/drebin/download.html. One can request login credentials and the password to download 
and unzip the samples from the authors (the website displays their contact information). 
5.3 AndRadar 
AndRadar dataset promotes research on identifying malicious apps in alternative markets (i.e., third-party 
markets from where users download the apps) that contain specifically ad-aggressive apps (adware). This 
dataset contains 7,800 malicious APKs (approx. 25 GB). Lindorfer et al. (2014b) collected the samples 
from June to November, 2013, from approximately 10 alternative markets (such as Slideme, Lenovo, 
Aptoide, etc.). The dataset contains comma-separated values (CSV) files with approximately 4,500 APKs 
that the authors identify by their message digest (MD5) hashes with the corresponding package name and 
market name in which they found the APKs. The CSV files contain duplicate MD5 hash values because 
the dataset contains different versions of malicious apps. One can request the dataset directly from the 
authors (their research paper contains their contact information). One does not need any login credentials 
or API key to download/access the samples. 
5.4 Ransomware 
Ransomware dataset provides Android ransomware samples from different families (such as 
Fakedefender, Simplocker, Koler, and so on) to the research community. This dataset contains 2,300 
malicious APKs (approx. 2.5 GB). Chen et al. (2018) collected the ransomware samples from an antivirus 
company (ANTIY) and blogs (Chebyshev & Unuchek, 2014; Jarvis, 2013) in 2017. The dataset contains 
Android ransomware samples along with their MD5 hashes. One can request the dataset and the 
password to decompress downloaded files from the authors (their research paper contains their contact 
information). 
5.5 VirusShare 
VirusShare.com, a malware repository, allows incident responders, practitioners, security researchers, 
malware analysts, and other morbidly curious people to easily access live malicious samples. This 
repository contains approximately 34 million malware samples (as of 2019) for all types of operating 
systems. For Android, the repository provides malicious APKs with MD5 hashes for all malware samples. 
VirusShare has collected, indexed, and freely shared malware samples to analysts, practitioners, 
researchers, and the information security community since 2011 (Virusshare, n.d.). However, Elish, Shu, 
Yao, Ryder, and Jiang (2015), Lindorfer et al. (2014a), and Saracino et al. (2016) began using this dataset 
from 2014. One can access the dataset and download samples from https://virusshare.com/. One can 
directly request login credentials from the administrators (the website displays their contact information). 
5.6 AndroZoo 
AndroZoo, a repository, contains a rich collection of Android malicious and benign apps from 16 different 
Android markets such as Genome, Appchina, Anzhi, Fdroid, 1mobile, PlayStore, and so on. Of these, only 
the Genome dataset contains malicious samples. Allix et al. (2016) collected approximately nine million 
APKs as of August, 2019. Additionally, they provide a CSV file for APKs with their SHA256, SHA1, MD5, 
apk size, dex size (size of the dex file), dex date (date attached to the dex file), pkg name (name of the 
Android package), vercode (version code), vt detection (antivirus software in VirusTotal that detected APK 
as a malware), vt scan date (date of detection), and markets (to which APK belongs). One can download 
the dataset with a tool (az) from GitHub1. However, one requires an API key to access it, which one can 
request from the dataset creators (the website displays their contact information). 
6 Implementation and Experimental Details 
In this section, we discuss how we performed reverse engineering and feature extraction on the samples 
in each dataset to extract features such as permissions and intents. Based on the extracted features, we 
performed Gaussian mixture model (GMM) clustering on each dataset to group malware with similar kinds 
 
1 https://github.com/ArtemKushnerov/az 
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of features in a single cluster. GMM clustering is an unsupervised machine-learning technique that does 
not require a labeled dataset for experimentation (Kumar, Venugopal, Qiu, & Kumar, 2018). Subsequently, 
we randomly chose samples from each cluster and used VirusTotal to analyze them to determine whether 
anti-virus software could actually detect malware. We used a system with the following specifications to 
perform the experiments: Windows 8.1 Pro 64-bit operating system, Intel Core i7-4770 CPU @ 3.40GHz, 
and 8.00 GB memory (RAM). We show the overall structure in Figure 2, which we explain in the following 
subsections. 
 
Figure 2. Overall Structure 
6.1 Reverse Engineering 
The datasets contained malicious samples in the form of Android package kits (APKs). Android uses the 
APK file format to transmit and install apps on mobile phones. We performed reverse engineering with 
ApkTool to disassemble all malicious APKs in each dataset into a readable format. The ApkTool 
(iBotPeaches, 2019) generates dex files, manifest.xml files, and smali files for each APK. We show the 
commands we used to disassemble the Android app with ApkTool in Figure 3 where “d” corresponds to 
decompiling the APK and “b” corresponds to repackaging the APK. 
 
Figure 3. ApkTool Commands 
>> java –jar apktool.jar
>> apktool d appname.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...




>> apktool b appname
I: Smaling smali folder into classes.dex...
I: Building resources...
I: Building apk file...
I: Built apk...
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6.2 Feature Extraction 
After disassembling the APK using reverse engineering, we analyzed AndroidManifest.xml file to extract 
features such as permissions and intents. We wrote a Python script to extract features that stored the 
output in comma-separated values (CSV files). We extracted permissions and intents from the 
AndroidManifest.xml files. 
6.2.1 Permissions 
All Java-written applications must receive permission from Android during installation. Android provides 
security to users by informing them about the permissions that any application obtains. Therefore, Android 
developers declare permissions in AndroidManifest.xml with the < uses−permissions > tag (see Figure 4). 
Thus, if an application wants access to the calendar, contacts, microphone, location, or any other API, 
then Android will message the user to either allow or deny the access. However, overclaiming permissions 
poses a drastic issue in Android that leads to information and monetary losses. For example, if a 
dictionary application requests unnecessary permission (e.g., READ_ PHONE_STATE), it can exploit the 
permission by sending the phone’s state such as its IMEI number without users’ consent. Attackers can 
use this feature to read users’ private information such as SMS, logs, and so on. 
Android contains approximately 300 permissions that any application can use. Of these 300, 24 pose a 
higher risk to users’ private data (Android, 2018). We list these 24 permissions in Table 2. 
6.2.2 Intents 
Intents are abstract objects in Android that an app uses to request an action from another app component. 
It switches the user from one app to another app based on action (e.g., showing a map, taking a photo, 
sending a message) it would like to perform. Basically, intents represent the glue that coordinates 
interactions between activities, services, and broadcast receivers. Just like permissions, Android 
developers declare intents in AndroidManifest.xml with the < action > tag (see Figure 4). Intents contain 
operations that an application component will perform (Tam, Feizollah, Anuar, Salleh, & Cavallaro, 2017). 
Attackers can use this feature to launch activities such as to obtain device administration privileges. 
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Table 2. Dangerous Permissions in Android OS 
Dangerous permission group Dangerous permissions Description 
CALENDAR READ/WRITE_CALENDAR Read/write the user's calendar data 
CALL_LOG 
READ /WRITE_CALL_LOG Read/write the user's call log 
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS 
Read the dialed number during an outgoing 
call 
CAMERA CAMERA Access the camera 
CONTACTS 
READ /WRITE_CONTACTS Read/write the user's contacts data 
GET_ACCOUNTS Access to the list of accounts 
LOCATION ACCESS_FINE/COARSE_LOCATION Access precise/approximate location 
MICROPHONE RECORD_AUDIO Record audio 
PHONE 
READ_PHONE_STATE 
Read access to phone state (ongoing calls, 
list of Phone Accounts) 
CALL_PHONE 
Start a phone call without using the Dialer 
to confirm the call 
ADD_VOICEMAIL Add voicemails in the voice box 
USE_SIP Use SIP service 
SENSORS BODY_SENSORS 
Acquire data collected by sensors (heart 
rate sensor) 
SMS 
SEND/RECEIVE/READ_SMS Send/receive/read short message service 
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH 
Receive wireless application protocol push 
messages 
RECEIVE_MMS 
Monitor incoming multimedia messaging 
service 
STORAGE READ/WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE Read/write external storage 
6.3 Clustering 
After accumulating features (i.e., permissions and intents) from each dataset sample’s 
AndroidManifest.xml file in CSV files, we performed clustering based on the extracted features to bifurcate 
each dataset’s malware samples into clusters. We performed the clustering in such as a way that a 
malware sample in one cluster resembled the other malware samples in the same cluster and did not 
resemble the malware samples in other clusters. We applied GMM clustering to group the malware with 
similar features in the same cluster. We performed the experiment with Python 3.6 on Colaboratory (a free 
GPU cloud service from Google). 
Gaussian mixture modeling is a machine learning-based clustering algorithm that models datasets into 
clusters according to different Gaussian distributions. It calculates the probability of each sample 
belonging to a cluster after computing mean (to determine the data’s center), variance (to determine the 
data’s spread), and mixing probability (to determine the Gaussian function’s size). 





2/2𝜎2 , (1) 
where X shows the data points, µ is the mean, 𝜎2 is the variance, and π is the mixing probability. 







(𝑋 − µ)𝑇∑−1(𝑋 − µ)), (2) 
where X shows the data points, µ is the d-dimensional vector, ∑ is the covariance matrix, and π is the 
mixing probability. 
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GMM follows the probabilistic model to automatically learn the subpopulation from the total population. It 
implements the EM algorithm, which contains two steps (an expectation step and maximization step) to 
calculate the model’s parameters (Kumar, Venugopal, Qiu, & Kumar, 2019). The expectation step 
calculates weights, whereas the maximization step updates the location and shape of all samples. 
In our experimental work, several Android malware samples possessed common features in each dataset. 
For example, approximately 2,200 samples in the ransomware dataset asked for the same permission 
(i.e., RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED). Thus, we used the GMM clustering algorithm, which allows soft 
assignments, to allow overlapping between clusters. 
6.4 Analysis in VirusTotal 
After grouping malware with similar types of features in a single cluster, we performed random sampling 
on it to select malware samples from different clusters for analysis in VirusTotal and, thus, check whether 
antivirus software could actually detect the malware. 
The website VirusTotal (VirusTotal, n.d.) analyzes files and URLs to detect malware. It has a Web 
interface and API through which it scans the malware on over 70 antivirus and URL/domain blacklisting 
services. It notifies the user whether the submitted file/URL is malicious or not, provides the detection 
label for each malware, states whether a URL belongs to a particular botnet, and provides other 
information. We submitted APKs after we performed random sampling on each dataset cluster to 
VirusTotal for analysis. VirusTotal computes the hash values of each APK and submits the APK to 
antivirus software (such as Avast, Fortinet, McAfee, Microsoft, etc.), which provides a detection output 
(whether the APK is malicious or not). 
7 Common Pitfalls in Dataset Selection 
In this section, we discuss common pitfalls in selecting the datasets in terms of sample size, 
standardization, sample demarcation, and sample depletion: 
Sample size: some Android malware datasets do not support robust statistics due to their small size. For 
example, Contagio contains only 215 APKs. Researchers may not find this data self-sufficient for use in 
research studies. Therefore, Mercaldo, Nardone, Santone, and Visaggio (2016), Saracino et al. (2016), 
and Yuan et al. (2016) integrated this dataset with other datasets such as Genome, VirusShare, and 
HelDroid. Further, the reverse-engineering process also eradicates some malware. 
Insufficient standardization: researchers need proper standardization to create and use Android 
malware datasets. For example, the Drebin, AndRadar, VirusShare, and Ransomware datasets use hash 
values to store each sample’s file name. While Contagio and AndroZoo use the name of corresponding 
malware to store each sample’s file name. The file name stored as hash value suits research studies 
more than the name of malware because using hashing removes duplicate samples. 
Samples demarcation: the AndroZoo repository does not separate malicious APKs from benign ones, 
although its creators provide a CSV file with ratings to show how many antiviruses consider that the app is 
malware. However, some malware (e.g., zero-day) evades VirusTotal’s security checks (Saracino et al., 
2016). Similarly, VirusTotal does not differentiate different types of malware in the datasets we collected 
(i.e., Drebin, AndRadar, VirusShare, and AndroZoo) as spyware, trojans, ransomware, grayware, rootkits, 
and so on. Thus, if, for example, practitioners and researchers want to perform experiments to detect only 
trojans, then they have to run each sample from these datasets in VirusTotal to know its category. In the 
same way, the Ransomware dataset does not differentiate samples according to their type (i.e., locker or 
crypto). Thus, if researchers or practitioners use this dataset to conduct a study entirely on locker 
ransomware, then they may find it difficult to differentiate different ransomware types. 
Samples depletion: the reverse-engineering process obliterates some APKs in each dataset. For 
example, the Ransomware dataset initially contained 2,288 APKs; however, after we applied reverse 
engineering, that number fell to 2,076 malicious samples. The depleted samples did not preserve any 
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8 Performance Evaluation and Experimental Results 
In this section, we discuss several performance metrics to evaluate how well the antivirus software could 
detect malware in the large datasets that we present in Section 5. To the best of our knowledge, no study 
has compared Android malware datasets in detail. Thus, we referred to related research papers from 
another field on the same theme (i.e., dataset collection and analysis) in order to choose the performance 
metrics. For example, Sakar et al. (2013) used true positive (TP), false positive (FP), true negative (TN), 
and false negative (FN) values to calculate how accurately Parkinson disease can be diagnosed using 
Parkinson speech dataset. They used an indistinguishable dataset (i.e. a dataset with all types of 
samples) and, hence, merged these values to classify instances as positive and negative. 
In comparison to the literature, we examined datasets with only malicious samples (e.g., Contagio, Drebin, 
AndRadar, Ransomware, VirusShare, and the Genome dataset in the AndroZoo repository) and with only 
benign samples (e.g., several datasets in the AndroZoo repository: PlayStore, 1mobile, fdroid, torrents, 
etc.). Thus, the TP and FP values belong to the datasets with malicious samples, whereas the TN and FN 
values belong to datasets with benign samples. 
True positives (TP): While submitting APKs, we examined the malicious apps that antivirus software 
detected—that is, the true positives (TP). Figure 5 shows the TP percentage for 10 dataset samples2 that 
we randomly selected from clusters in each dataset. Out of these datasets, the AndRadar dataset had the 
fewest TP followed by VirusShare, Ransomware, Contagio, Drebin, and Genome (in the AndroZoo 
repository). 
False positives (FP): While submitting APKs, we examined the malicious apps that antivirus software 
mistakenly considered benign—that is, the false positives (FP). K7antivirus, Malwarebytes, Microsoft, and 
other anti-malware software could not detect some Android malware. Figure 6 shows the FP percentage 
for 10 dataset samples3 randomly selected from clusters in each dataset. Out of these datasets, the 
Genome dataset (in the AndroZoo repository) had the fewest FP followed by Drebin, Contagio, 
Ransomware, VirusShare, and AndRadar. 
True negatives (TN): While submitting APKs, we examined the number of benign apps that antivirus 
software successfully detected—that is, the true negatives (TN). Since only the AndroZoo repository 
contained benign samples (refer to Section 5.6), we calculated the TN values for 10 dataset samples4 that 
we randomly selected from clusters in benign datasets in the AndroZoo repository. We considered the 
other datasets to have a TN value of 0 since they did not contain benign samples. 
False negatives (FN): While submitting APKs, we examined the number of benign apps that antivirus 
software mistakenly considered malicious—that is, the false negatives (FN). Since only the AndroZoo 
repository contained benign samples (refer to Section 5.6), we calculated the FN values for 10 dataset 
samples5 that we randomly selected from clusters in benign datasets in the AndroZoo repository. We 
considered the other datasets to have a FN value of 0 since they did not contain benign samples. 
 
2 Table 3 shows the average of TP values. 
3 Table 3 shows the average of FP values. 
4 Table 3 shows the average of TN values. 
5 Table 3 shows the average of FN values. 
631 Investigating Selection Strategies for Android Malware Datasets Using a Machine-learning Approach 
 
Volume 46 10.17705/1CAIS.04626 Paper 26 
 
 
Figure 5. True Positive (Percentage) of Six Malicious Datasets 
 
 
Figure 6. False Positive (percentage) of Six Malicious Datasets 
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We now explain why some datasets achieved high TP and some achieved low FP, which one can see in 
Figures 5 and 6. 
The AndroZoo repository contains malicious samples in the Genome dataset file, which includes Android 
trojans (malicious apps that masquerade as benign apps to perform damaging actions such as stealing 
SMS, contacts, IMEI number, and photos and sending such things to a remote server without users’ 
consent). Commercial antivirus software can easily detect Android trojans. Hence, these samples had the 
most TP and correspondingly the fewest FP. 
The Drebin dataset primarily contains Android trojans that antivirus software can easily detect. Therefore, 
this dataset had a high antivirus detection rate and, thus, a high number of TP. However, it also contains 
adware and riskware samples that had a low TP percentage; and can cause harm if cybercriminals exploit 
them. Hence, Microsoft, Malwarebytes, K7AntiVirus, and other antivirus software did not detect these 
apps. 
The Contagio dataset contains Android trojans samples. It also contains grayware, adware, and 
potentially unwanted program (PUP) samples that Microsoft, Malwarebytes, K7AntiVirus, and other 
commercial antivirus software did not detect. Hence, it had fewer TP and more FP compared to the 
AndroZoo and Drebin datasets. 
The Ransomware dataset contains Android ransomware samples in many variants such as Koler, locker, 
Jisut, and more. These samples had fewer TP and more FP compared to AndroZoo, Drebin, and Contagio 
as antivirus software did not detect most ransomware samples. Because locker ransomware obtains only 
one dangerous permission from users (READ_PHONE_STATE), which many legitimate apps also use, 
Malwarebytes, Microsoft, K7AntiVirus, and other antivirus software failed to detect these samples. 
The VirusShare dataset contains many different Android malicious samples, such as riskware, adware 
(responsible for throwing advertisements on screen), PUA, trojans, and so on. Out of these samples, 
riskware, adware, and PUA samples had few TP and many FP. In particular, the PUA and riskware 
samples had few TP since Avast, McAfee, Microsoft, Fortinet, Kaspersky, and other antivirus software did 
not detect them. 
The AndRadar dataset also contains many different Android malicious samples such as PUA, adware, 
riskware, and more. These samples had the fewest TP and most FP compared to other datasets since 
Avast, Microsoft, Malwarebytes, Symantec, and other antivirus software did not detect them. 
Based on these values, we calculated how accurately the antivirus software performed for each dataset. 
Accuracy here refers to the ratio of how accurately anti-virus software can correctly detect malicious and 
benign samples compared to the total number of input samples. We calculated it using Equation 3: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)
 (3) 
The equation produces an accuracy value: low values suggest a dataset contained samples that antivirus 
software detected the least often. Table 3 shows the results for malicious and benign samples from the six 
malicious datasets (i.e., Contagio, Drebin, AndRadar, Ransomware, VirusShare, and the Genome dataset 
in AndroZoo) and one benign dataset (PlayStore, 1mobile, fdroid, torrents, and so on in Androzoo) that we 
randomly selected from clusters that contained similar kinds of samples. Applied to these samples, the 
AndRadar dataset had the lowest accuracy value (26.5%) followed by VirusShare, Ransomware, 
Contagio, Drebin, and AndroZoo.  











AndRadar 14.9 41.4 0 0 26.5 
VirusShare 18.4 40.3 0 0 31.3 
Ransomware 29.2 32.1 0 0 47.6 
Contagio 32.7 27.4 0 0 54.4 
Drebin 38.5 22.3 0 0 63.3 
AndroZoo 41.3 19.9 60.4 0.2 83.6 
633 Investigating Selection Strategies for Android Malware Datasets Using a Machine-learning Approach 
 
Volume 46 10.17705/1CAIS.04626 Paper 26 
 
9 Discussion and Conclusions 
Due to global smartphone usage’s ubiquity and Android’s rise as the dominant mobile operating system, 
we collected and compared samples of leading Android malware datasets. In each dataset, we 
characterized applications according to their availability, which ranged from free direct downloads and 
open-source software apps to protected applications, which may include services or subscriptions that 
require user credentials or API keys. We stored each sample’s extracted features (i.e., requested 
permissions and intents that prompt users for access privileges) in a file after we performed reverse 
engineering. In each dataset, we grouped samples with similar features in a single cluster using machine-
learning techniques. Using VirusTotal, we investigated random samples that we collected from each 
cluster to check how well antivirus software detected them. 
We compared the results among different datasets to find the dataset with malicious samples that 
antivirus software detected the least often. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first study that 
focuses on collecting and examining Android-specific malware datasets in order to help practitioners and 
researchers select a dataset that contains malicious samples that antivirus software detects the least 
often and on evaluating malware-detection techniques to improve the security on Android devices. We 
found that, in the case of malicious dataset samples, antivirus software detected AndRadar samples the 
least often since that dataset contains extreme adware samples. 
Our findings act as an exhaustive information source about the leading Android malware datasets. Our 
results provide key information to managers and technical experts working in various organizations who 
work on securing Android-based smartphones. Decision makers can use the information we provide to 
choose the best dataset to implement machine-learning algorithms for detecting and preventing Android 
malware. In the future, we plan to extend this work to include more features. Moreover, we need a robust 
mechanism to detect further types of Android malware (such as adware and grayware), which antivirus 
software cannot detect as yet. 
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